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Removal for Cause: Seila Law and the Future of the 
CFPB and FHFA  
I.  INTRODUCTION 
On June 29, 2020, the Supreme Court severed the provision of 
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 
2010 (“Dodd-Frank”)1 granting the Director of the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau (“CFPB” or the “Bureau”) for-cause removal 
protection.2  The decision, Seila Law LLC v. CFPB3—billed as the 
“Constitutional Case of the Year” by the Wall Street Journal4—largely 
settles the debate over the constitutionality of restrictions on the 
President’s ability to remove single officers that head executive agencies 
in favor of at-will removal power.5  However, other questions remain.    
Seila Law has significant implications for other financial 
regulatory agencies that merit serious consideration.6  In a case pending 
in its upcoming Term, the Court will likely uphold a lower court’s 
decision that Director of the Federal Housing Finance Authority 
(“FHFA”) is similarly removable at will.7  Seila Law has also given the 
President greater control over not only the CFPB, but also U.S. financial 
regulatory policy generally, as the decision also heightens the President’s 
 
1. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) § 1011, 
12 U.S.C. § 5491(c)(3) (2018).  
2. Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2211 (2020) (“[W]e find the Director’s 
removal protection severable from the other provisions of the Dodd-Frank that establish the 
CFPB . . .”).  
3. Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020). 
4. Editorial Board, Editorial, Constitutional Case of the Year, WALL ST. J. (March 2, 2020, 
7:26 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/constitutional-case-of-the-year-11583195178 
[https://perma.cc/V6XN-ZGHD]. 
5. Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2211. 
6. See Oral Argument at 2:14, Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020) (No. 19-
7), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2019/19-7 [https://perma.cc/ZL85-7QWH] (The late Justice 
Ginsburg remarked at oral argument that “this case has . . . an academic quality to it.”).    
7. Collins v. Mnuchin, 938 F.3d 553, 563 (5th Cir. 2019) (en banc), cert. granted, 141 S. 
Ct. 193 (2020) (holding the FHFA Director’s for-cause removal protection violates the 
separation of powers).  
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influence over the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) and 
the Financial Stability Oversight Council (“FSOC”).8    
This Note argues that while Seila Law alters the CFPB’s 
structure, the decision leaves the Bureau’s rulemaking and enforcement 
powers intact and will trigger a similar fate for the Federal Housing 
Finance Agency (“FHFA”).  This Note proceeds in seven parts.  Part II 
describes the CFPB’s creation, structure, and powers.9  Part III examines 
the controversy around the CFPB Director’s for-cause removal protection 
and explores the early legal challenges to the Bureau’s structure that 
ultimately laid the groundwork for the Supreme Court in Seila Law.10  
Part IV scrutinizes the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Seila Law.11  Part V 
argues that while Seila Law will not impact the CFPB’s current and future 
regulatory powers, the decision will likely facilitate a major shift in the 
Bureau’s activities under the Biden administration.12  Part VI analyzes 
the decision’s effects on the FHFA and the other federal financial 
regulatory agencies.13  Finally, Part VII concludes the Note and looks to 
the CFPB’s future as an agency led by a Director removable by the 
President at will.14 
II.  BACKGROUND: THE CFPB’S CREATION, STRUCTURE, AND POWERS 
The CFPB was created by Dodd-Frank15 in response to calls for 
an overhaul of the federal consumer protection laws following the 2008 
financial crisis.16  Congress designed the CFPB as an independent 
 
8. Todd Phillips, The Impacts of Seila Law Beyond Consumer Finance, THE FINREG BLOG 
(July 9, 2020), https://sites.law.duke.edu/thefinregblog/2020/07/09/the-impacts-of-seila-law-
beyond-consumer-finance/ [https://perma.cc/ZET6-R544]. 
9. See infra Part II. 
10. See infra Part III. 
11. See infra Part IV. 
12. See infra Part V. 
13. See infra Part VI. 
14. See infra Part VII. 
15.  The statute refers to the CFPB as the “Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection.”  
Dodd-Frank § 1011, 12 U.S.C. § 5491(a).  Although Dodd-Frank was signed into law by 
President Barack Obama on July 21, 2010, the Bureau did not become fully empowered until 
July 21, 2011 due to Dodd-Frank’s “transfer date” provision.  Dodd-Frank § 1062, 12 U.S.C. 
§ 5582; see also Donald C. Lampe & Ryan J. Richardson, The Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau at Five: A Survey of the Bureau’s Activities, 21 N.C. BANKING INST. 85, 86 (2017) 
(discussing the “transfer date” provision and the CFPB’s delayed empoyerment).          
16. Senator Elizabeth Warren—at the time, a Harvard Law School Professor—was a 
prominent voice in support of the creation of a consumer protection agency.  See BARACK 
OBAMA, A PROMISED LAND 552 (2020) (describing Warren’s advocacy for “a new consumer 
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executive agency housed within the Federal Reserve System (“Federal 
Reserve”).17  The Bureau receives its funding from a percentage of the 
Federal Reserve’s annual operating expenses rather than through 
Congressional appropriation.18  Congress tasked the CFPB with 
“ensuring that . . . markets for consumer financial products and services 
are fair, transparent, and competitive.”19  The CFPB was delegated the 
authority to administer eighteen existing federal consumer finance 
statutes,20  and was also given enforcement authority over Dodd-Frank’s 
 
finance protection agency meant to bolster the pathwork of spottily enforced state and federal 
regulations already in place and to sheild consumers from questionable financial products . . 
.”).  Her famous 2007 article “Unsafe at Any Rate” called for the agency’s creation to improve 
the “regulatory jumble” of federal consumer financial protection laws.  Elizabeth Warren, 
Unsafe at Any Rate, DEMOCRACY J. (Summer 2007), 
https://democracyjournal.org/magazine/5/unsafe-at-any-rate/ [https://perma.cc/87C5-28XR]; 
see also Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 152 U. PENN. L. REV. 1, 98 
(2008) (“We propose the creation of a single federal regulator—a new Financial Product 
Safety Commission or a new consumer credit division within an existing agency (most likely 
the [Federal Reserve Board] or FTC)—that will be put in charge of consumer credit 
products.”).  The Obama administration advocated for a similar solution.   See DEPT. OF 
TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW FOUNDATION 55–75 (2009), 
https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/wsr/Documents/FinalReport_web.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6UCC-JFPF] (proposing “the creation of a single federal agency . . . 
dedicated to protecting consumers in the financial products and services markets” and to be 
granted rulemaking, enforcement, and supervisory authority).    
17. Dodd-Frank § 1011, 12 U.S.C. § 5491(a) (“There is established in the Federal Reserve 
System, an independent bureau to be known as the ‘Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection’ 
. . . . The Bureau shall be considered an Executive agency . . . .”); see also Adam J. Levitin, 
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: An Introduction, 32 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 
321, 337 (2013) (“The CFPB was deliberately designed to be a highly independent agency.”).   
18. Dodd-Frank § 1017, 12 U.S.C. § 5497(a)(2)(A)(iii) (“[T]he amount that shall be 
transferred to the Bureau in each fiscal year shall not exceed a fixed percentage of the total 
operating expenses of the Federal Reserve System . . . equal to . . . 12 percent of such expenses 
in fiscal year 2013, and in each year thereafter.”).  For a general discussion of the CFPB’s 
funding arrangement, see Lampe & Richardson, supra note 15, at 92–93 (“By virtue of its 
position within the Federal Reserve System, the Bureau is guaranteed an operating budget.”).  
19. Dodd-Frank § 1021, 12 U.S.C. § 5511(a); see also RICHARD CORDRAY, WATCHDOG: 
HOW PROTECTING CONSUMERS CAN SAVE OUR FAMILIES, OUR ECONOMY, AND OUR 
DEMOCRACY 29 (2020) (“The idea was to create a government agency with a singular mission: 
to stand on the side of consumers and ensure they are treated fairly in the financial 
marketplace.”).      
20. See Dodd-Frank § 1022, 12 U.S.C. § 5512 (authorizing the CFPB to “administer, 
enforce, and otherwise implement the provisions of Federal consumer financial law”); see 
also Dodd-Frank § 1002, 12 U.S.C. § 5481(12), (14) (enumerating the federal consumer 
financial laws to be administered by the CFPB).  These federal consumer finance statutes 
include the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (1970), 
except with respect to sections 615(e) and 628 of that Act; the Fair Debt Collection Practices 
Act (“FDCPA”), Pub. L. 95-109, 91 Stat. 874 (1977); and the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”), 
Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968).      
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new prohibition on “any unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts and practices” 
(“UDAAP”).21 
The CFPB is led by a single Director, appointed to a five-year 
term by the President and confirmed by the Senate.22  Congress granted 
the Director for-cause removal protection by allowing the President to 
remove the Director only “for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or 
malfeasance in office.”23  The Director is required to appoint a Deputy 
Director24 and has discretion to employ personnel “deemed necessary to 
conduct the business of the Bureau.”25  
The CFPB possesses substantial rulemaking powers over the 
consumer financial services market.26  Dodd-Frank vests the Bureau with 
the authority “to administer, enforce, and otherwise implement . . . 
[f]ederal consumer financial law.”27  The Bureau—under the Director’s 
command—promulgates rules affecting “covered persons” and “service 
providers.”28  “Covered persons” broadly includes “any person that 
engages in offering or providing a consumer financial product or 
service”,29 and Dodd-Frank defines “consumer financial product or 
 
21. Dodd-Frank § 1036, 12 U.S.C. § 5536(a)(1)(B) (“It shall be unlawful for . . . any 
covered person or service provider . . . to engage in any unfair deceptive, or abusive act or 
practice . . . .”) 
22. Dodd-Frank § 1017, 12 U.S.C. § 5491(b)(2), (c)(1).  The CFPB Director is also a 
member of the Financial Stability Oversight Council (“FSOC”).  Dodd-Frank § 111, 12 
U.S.C. § 5321(b)(1).           
23. Dodd-Frank § 1017, 12 U.S.C. § 5491(c)(3). 
24. Dodd-Frank § 1011, 12 U.S.C. § 5491(b)(5)(A).  The Deputy Director “shall serve as 
acting Director in the absence or unavailability of the Director.”  Dodd-Frank § 1011, 12 
U.S.C. § 5491(b)(5). 
25. Dodd-Frank § 1013, 12 U.S.C. § 5493(a)(1)(A)–(B) (“The Director may fix the number 
or, and appoint and direct, all employees of the Bureau” and “is authorized to employ 
attorneys, compliance examiners, compliance supervision analysts, economists, statisticians, 
and other employees as may be deemed necessary to conduct the business of the Bureau.”).  
26. See Dodd-Frank § 1012, 12 U.S.C. § 5492 (“Executive and Administrative Powers.”); 
see also Lampe & Richardson, supra note 15, at 95 (“The Dodd-Frank Act vests the CFPB, a 
single entity, with broad rulemaking, supervision, and enforcement powers over significant 
segments of the consumer financial services market.”).  
27. Dodd-Frank § 1022, 12 U.S.C. § 5512(a).  
28. Dodd-Frank § 1031, 12 U.S.C. § 5531(b) (“The Bureau may prescribe rules applicable 
to a covered person or service provider identify as unlawful unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts 
or practices in connection with any transaction with a consumer for a consumer financial 
product or service, or the offering of a consumer financial product or service.”).   
29. Dodd-Frank § 1002, 12 U.S.C. § 5481(6)(A).  “Covered persons” also includes “any 
affiliate” of a “covered person” who “acts as a service provider to such a [covered] person.”  
Id. § 5481(6)(B). 
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service” in further detail.30  “Service provider” is defined as “any person 
that provides a material service to a covered person in connection with 
the offering or provision by such covered person of a consumer financial 
product or service.”31  These broad statutory definitions facilitate the 
CFPB’s issuance of rules prohibiting UDAAP,32 as well as rules requiring 
certain individuals and entities to register with the agency33 or requiring 
disclosure of certain information to consumers.34  In short, the CFPB is 
vested with rulemaking authority over vast swaths of the American 
consumer finance landscape.35      
The Bureau’s regulatory power is subject to only a few 
limitations.36  The FSOC37 may stay or set aside, at the request of any of 
 
30. A product is only considered a “consumer financial product or service” if listed as a 
“financial product or service” in the statute and if it is “offered or provided for use by 
consumers primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.” Id. § 5481(5)(A).  
“Financial product or service” is itself defined at length in the statute.  Id. § 5481(15).  For a 
helpful summary of this rather cumbersome definition, see Levitin, supra note 17, at 346 
(noting “financial product or service” includes “extensions, servicing, brokerage, and sales of 
credit”; “real estate settlement services other than appraisals and insurance”; “deposit taking”; 
“check cashing, collection, and guarantee services”; “financial advisory services”; and “debt 
collection,” among others).  “Financial product or service” does not include insurance 
activities or “electronic conduit services.”  Dodd-Frank § 1002, § 5481(15)(C).        
31. Dodd-Frank § 1002, 12 U.S.C. § 5481(26)(A).  “Service provider” also includes any 
person that “participates in designing, operating, or maintaining the consumer financial 
product or service” or “ processes transactions relating to the consumer financial product or 
service other than unknowingly or incidentally transmitting or processing financial data in a 
manner that such data is undifferentiated from other types of data in the same form as the 
person transmits or processes.”  Id.  However, persons who only provide general “support” or 
“ministerial services” are excluded from this definition, as are “time or space for an 
advertisement for a consumer financial product or service through print, newspaper, or 
electronic media.”  Id. § 5481(26)(B).   
32. See Dodd-Frank § 1022, 12 U.S.C. § 5511(b)(2) (authorizing the CFPB to “exercise its 
authorities” with respect to UDAAP).   
33. See Dodd-Frank § 1022, 12 U.S.C. § 5512(c)(7) (“The Bureau may prescribe rules 
regarding registration requirements applicable to a covered person, other than an insured 
depository institution, insured credit union, or related person.”). 
34. See Dodd-Frank § 1033, 12 U.S.C. § 5533(a) (requiring a “covered person” to disclose 
information “concerning the consumer financial product or service that the consumer obtained 
from such covered person”).    
35. See Lampe & Richardson, supra note 15, at 102 (“The agency’s organic rulemaking 
powers enable the CFPB to prescribe rules, for purposes set forth in Title X [of Dodd-Frank], 
that govern nearly all segments of the consumer financial services market.”).     
36. See infra nn.36–41. 
37. Another creation of Dodd-Frank, the FSOC is tasked with “identify[ing] risks to the 
financial stability of the United States” caused by the “financial distress or failure, or ongoing 
activities, of large, interconnected bank holding companies or nonbank financial companies, 
or that could arise outside the financial services marketplace”; “promot[ing] market 
discipline” to eliminate the belief that the federal government will rescue entities deemed too 
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its member agencies and after a two-thirds majority vote, any CFPB 
rulemaking that the FSOC determines would jeopardize bank “safety and 
soundness” or the “stability of the financial system of the United States” 
generally.38  CFPB rulemaking is also subject to procedural limitations, 
such as the notice-and-comment requirements of the Administrative 
Procedure Act (“APA”),39 the cost-benefit analysis requirements of the 
Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”),40 and the Small Business 
Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 (“SBREFA”).41  Finally, 
as with any administrative agency, the CFPB can only promulgate rules 
under the framework of its enabling statutes;42 Congress is free to alter 
the boundaries of the Bureau’s regulatory authority via legislation.43 
The CFPB also possesses supervisory, enforcement, and 
adjudicatory powers.44  The Bureau has exclusive authority to supervise, 
examine, and enforce regulatory compliance of banks, credit unions, and 
 
big to fail; and “respond[ing] to emerging threats to the stability of the United States financial 
system.”  Dodd-Frank § 112, 12 U.S.C. § 5322(a)(1).      
38. Dodd-Frank § 1022, 12 U.S.C. § 5513(a)–(c).  A decision by the FSOC to set aside a 
CFPB regulation is subject to judicial review.  Id. § 5513(c)(8).    
39. Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) § 553, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2018).  Like other 
federal government agencies, the CFPB must publish a notice of proposed rulemaking in the 
Federal Register and hear public comments before issuing a final rule.  Id. 
40. Dodd-Frank § 1022, 12 U.S.C § 5512(b)(2)(A)(i) (“In prescribing a rule under the 
Federal consumer financial laws, the Bureau shall consider the potential benefits and costs to 
consumers and covered persons, including the potential reduction of access by consumers to 
consumer financial products or services resulting from such rule.”). 
41. Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 (“SBREFA”), Pub. L. 
No. 104-121, 110 Stat. 847 (1996).  Prior to publishing a notice of proposed rulemaking, the 
CFPB must convene a review panel (“SBREFA Panel”) consisting of representatives from 
the CFPB, the Small Business Administration (“SBA”), and the White House Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs (“OIRA”).  5 U.S.C. § 609(b)(3).  The SBREFA Panel is 
required to hear testimony from representatives of relevant small business communities about 
the potential costs of the CFPB’s proposed rule to such small business communities, then 
summarize its findings in a report.  Id. § 609(b)(4)–(5).  The CFPB must consider this report 
and discuss any response in the agency’s notice of proposed rulemaking.  Id. § 609(b)(6).  The 
CFPB, the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), and the Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration (“OSHA”) are the only three federal agencies subject to this 
requirement.  Id. § 609(d). 
42. See Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 475 (2001) (“[T]he 
degree of agency discretion that is acceptable varies according to the scope of the power 
congressionally conferred.”).  
43. For specific provisions that cabin the CFPB’s regulatory authority, see, for example, 
Dodd-Frank § 1012, 12 U.S.C. § 5492 (“Executive and Administrative Powers”); Dodd-Frank 
§ 1022, 12 U.S.C. § 5512 (“Rulemaking Authority”); and Dodd-Frank §§ 1024–1026, 12 
U.S.C. §§ 5514–5516 (supervisory authorities).    
44. See generally Dodd-Frank §§ 1031–1097, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5531–5538 (“Specific Bureau 
Authorities”); see also Dodd-Frank §§ 1051–1057, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5561–5567 (“Enforcement 
Powers”).   
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their affiliates with total assets of more than $10 billion.45  The Bureau 
also possesses supervisory and enforcement powers over nonbank 
entities such as residential mortgage lenders and brokers, payday lenders, 
and providers of private education loans.46  To ensure compliance with 
its rules and federal consumer protection laws generally, the CFPB may 
issue subpoenas47 and civil investigative demands (“CIDs”),48 conduct 
administrative proceedings,49 and prosecute violations of its directives in 
federal court.50 
 
45. See Dodd-Frank § 1025, 12 U.S.C. § 5515(a)–(b) (“The Bureau shall have exclusive 
authority to require reports and conduct examinations on a periodic basis . . . for purposes of 
(A) assessing compliance with the requirements of Federal consumer financial laws; (B) 
obtaining information about the activities subject to such laws and the associated compliance 
systems or procedures of such persons; and (C) detecting and assessing associated risks to 
consumers and to markets for consumer financial products and services.”).  Banks, credit 
unions, and their affiliates with total assets under $10 billion are subject to supervision, 
examination, and enforcement by their federal prudential regulator, be it the Federal Reserve 
Board of Governors, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, or the National Credit 
Union Administration.  Dodd-Frank § 1026, 12 U.S.C. § 5516.    
46. Dodd-Frank § 1024, 12 U.S.C. § 5514.  However, the CFPB has no authority “over a 
motor vehicle dealer that is predominantly engaged in the sale and servicing of motor vehicles, 
the leasing and servicing of motor vehicles, or both,” unless such a dealer is also involved in 
consumer services “related to residential or commercial mortgages of self-financing 
transactions involving real property” or, in some circumstances, “extends retail credit or 
leases involving motor vehicles.”  Dodd-Frank § 1029, 12 U.S.C. § 5519(a)–(b).    
47. Dodd-Frank § 1052, 12 U.S.C. § 5562(b).   
48. Dodd-Frank § 1052, 12 U.S.C. § 5562(c).  The CFPB may issue CIDs to any person 
“the Bureau has reason to believe . . . may be in possession, custody, or control of any 
documentary material or tangible things, or may have any information, relevant to a violation” 
of federal consumer financial law.  Id.  Through such CIDs, the Bureau may require 
production of documents or “tangible things,” written reports or answers, or oral testimony.  
Id.       
49. Dodd-Frank § 1053, 12 U.S.C. § 5563(a).  A CFPB “hearing officer” presides over 
these proceedings and issues a “recommended decision,” which is then presented to the 
Director who “issue[s] a final decision and order.”  Authority of the hearing officer, 12 C.F.R. 
§ 1081.104(b) (2018); Recommended decision of the hearing officer, 12 C.F.R. § 1081.400(d) 
(2018).    
50.  Dodd-Frank § 1054, 12 U.S.C. § 5564(a).  Through either a court action or 
administrative proceeding, the CFPB may seek or award a variety of remedies including 
“rescission or reformation of contracts”; “refund of moneys or return of real property”; 
“disgorgement or compensation for unjust enrichment”; “limits on the activities or functions 
of the person”; and civil money penalties, damage awards, or other monetary relief.  Dodd-
Frank § 1055, 12 U.S.C. § 5565(a).     
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III.  EARLY CONTROVERSY AND LEGAL CHALLENGES 
The CFPB’s structure was controversial from its earliest days.51  
The Bureau’s architects argued political independence was necessary to 
ensure adequate enforcement of consumer protection laws52 in the face of 
an existing failed regulatory structure and well-financed industry 
opposition to increased regulatory oversight.53  On the other hand, many 
congressional Republicans argued Congress had granted the Bureau too 
much regulatory power to be wielded by a single director removable only 
“for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.”54  Critics also 
pointed to the fact that most of the existing independent federal financial 
regulators—including the Federal Reserve, the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (“FDIC”), the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
(“CFTC”), and the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”)—are 
overseen by multi-member boards or commissions, and argued the CFPB 
Director’s removal protection was excessive insulation of a powerful 
executive branch agency.55  That insulation, however, was a deliberate 
 
51. See Levitin, supra note 17, at 336 (“The CFPB was one of the most controversial and 
hard-fought parts of the legislation that became the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010.”).  
52. See id. at 329 (“The pre-CFPB consumer financial protection regime had four major 
structural flaws: (1) consumer protection was an ‘orphan’ mission that had no regulatory 
‘home’ in any single agency; (2) consumer protection was often subordinated to regulatory 
concerns about bank profitability; (3) there was a lack of regulatory expertise in consumer 
financial issues; and (4) the diffusion of regulatory responsibility created regulatory arbitrage 
opportunities that fueled a race to the bottom.”); see also Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating 
Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 18 (2010) 
(“What policy makers who seek insultation want to avoid are particular pitfalls of 
politicization, such as pressures that prioritize narrow short-term interests at the expense of 
long-term public welfare.”).    
53. See AMS. FOR FIN. REFORM, PAYDAY PAY-TO-PLAY 2 (2014), 
https://ourfinancialsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Payday-pay-to-play-final.pdf, 
[https://perma.cc/6GBX-3NFM] (noting that payday lenders and their trade associations 
reported over $15 million of political spending in the 2013–2014 election cycle alone). 
54. Dodd-Frank § 1017, 12 U.S.C. § 5491(c)(3).  For example, Senator Richard Shelby (R-
AL), then-Chair of the Senate Banking Committee, condemned the CFPB as “the most 
powerful yet unaccountable bureaucracy in the federal government” and called for (1) 
replacing the single Director with a board of directors; (2) subjecting the Bureau to the 
congressional appropriations process; and (3) subjecting Bureau action to oversight by the 
Fed, FDIC, and OCC.  Richard Shelby, The Danger of an Unaccountable “Consumer-
Protection” Czar, WALL ST. J. (July 21, 2011), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424053111903554904576457931310814462 
[https://perma.cc/N3HZ-2N7H].      
55. See id. (“Another myth is that the [CFPB] is already more accountable than any other 
financial regulator.  This is nonsense.  The [SEC] is subject to congressional appropriations 
and is led by a multi-member panel, as is the [CFTC].  The Federal Reserve and the [FDIC] 
are also led by boards.”).   
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legislative choice intended to shield the Bureau from partisan control or 
industry capture, as well as to deny the President the ability to remove the 
Director over policy disagreement.56     
After Dodd-Frank was passed on a largely party-line vote57 and 
the CFPB began carrying out its statutory mandate, the debate over the 
agency’s constitutionality continued throughout the remainder of the 
Obama administration and into the 2016 general election.58  Republicans 
regained House majority status alongside President Donald Trump’s 
inauguration in 2017 and initiated attempts to reform the CFPB59 and 
Dodd-Frank generally, including the proposed Financial CHOICE Act of 
2017 (“CHOICE Act”)60 and the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, 
 
56. See CORDRAY, supra note 19, at 30–31 (“Banking lobbyists did not want the new 
agency at all, and they certainly did not want it to have this kind of independence, which 
insulates it from the pressures they can exert with their considerable influence over legislative 
and executive oversight. . . . As enacted, the Consumer Bureau was designed to be both 
independent and strong enough to take on the financial industry on behalf of individual 
customers.  This was in sharp contrast to the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), a financial 
agency that was eliminated by the [Dodd-Frank Act]. . . . The OTS was viewed as a classic 
instance of ‘agency capture,’ where some key officials had cozied up so closely to the 
companies they were supposed to regulate that they came to share and support their 
perspective on the world.”).        
57. See Binyamin Appelbaum & David M. Herszenhorn, Financial Overhaul Signals Shift 
on Deregulation, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2010), 
https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/2010/07/16/business/16regulate.html 
[https://perma.cc/39UF-B2D5] (noting Dodd-Frank passed “largely along party lines” with 
only three Republican votes in the Senate and House of Representatives each); see also 
CORDRAY, supra note 19, at 28 (“Most Democrats pushed for financial reform, while almost 
every Republican opposed [Dodd-Frank] as a blatant expansion of government that would 
intervene too heavily in the marketplace.”).  
58. See COMM. ON ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE 2016 REPUBLICAN NAT’L CONVENTION, 
REPUBLICAN PLATFORM 2016 3 (2016), https://prod-cdn-
static.gop.com/media/documents/DRAFT_12_FINAL%5B1%5D-ben_1468872234.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8LXP-CN6N] (“The worst of Dodd-Frank is the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau, deliberately designed to be a rogue agency.  It answers neither to Congress 
nor the executive, has its own guaranteed funding outside the appropriations process, and uses 
its slush fund to steer settlements to politically favored groups.  Its Director has dictatorial 
powers unique in the American Republic. . . . If the Bureau is not abolished, it should be 
subjected to congressional appropriations.  In that way, consumer protection in the financial 
markets can be advanced through measures that are both effective and constitutional.”).        
59. See, e.g., Jeb Hensarling, How We’ll Stop a Rogue Federal Agency, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 
8, 2017, 6:43 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-well-stop-a-rogue-federal-agency-
1486597413, [https://perma.cc/T9L5-5YFV] (arguing Congress should “direct the Fed to 
terminate CFPB funding” and “transfer the CFPB’s consumer protection role to the Federal 
Trade Commission or back to traditional banking regulators”). 
60. Financial CHOICE Act of 2018, H.R. 5983, 114th Cong. (2016).  Introduced by 
Representative Jeb Hensarling (R-TX), the Chairman of the House Financial Services 
Committee, the CHOICE Act would have replaced the CFPB with a “Consumer Law 
Enforcement Agency” and would have drastically reduced the agency’s regulatory, 
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and Consumer Protection Act of 2018 (“EGRRCPA”).61  EGRRCPA was 
signed into law in May 2018,62 and while it largely addressed other 
provisions of Dodd-Frank and did not reform the CFPB’s structure or its 
Director’s removal protection, EGRRCPA did amend the Home 
Mortgage Disclosure Act (“HDMA”)63 to exempt certain institutions 
from CFPB mortgage lending reporting requirements.64     
This political sparring over the Bureau’s constitutionality has 
been reflected in notable personnel turnover in the CFPB Directorship in 
recent years.65  When the CFPB’s first Director, Richard Cordray, 
resigned in order to run for Governor of Ohio, President Trump appointed 
Mick Mulvaney, then-Director of the Office of Management and Budget 
(“OMB”), as “Acting Director” of the Bureau.66  After an unsuccessful 
legal challenge by CFPB Deputy Director Leandra English seeking to 
prevent Mulvaney from assuming leadership of the Bureau,67 Acting 
Director Mulvaney ushered in a new era for the CFPB marked by a 
 
examination, and enforcement powers, and would have altered the agency’s leadership and 
funding structures.  Id. §§ 711–37.  The House passed the CHOICE Act in June 2017, but the 
Senate declined to act on the bill.  See Eric J. Spitler, The Long Game: The Decade-Long 
Effort to Dismantle the Dodd-Frank Act, 24 N.C. BANKING INST. 1, 46–69 (2020) (“[T]he 
CHOICE Act would have repealed or amended almost every section of the Dodd-Frank Act 
had it been enacted into law. . . Without a sixty-vote margin the Senate, and with strong 
opposition to the bill by the Democrats in the Senate, there was never any real prospect that 
the Senate would take it up.”). 
61. Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act of 2018, Pub. L. 
No. 115-174, 132 Stat. 1296 (2018).  
62. Id.; see also RICHARD M. ALEXANDER ET AL., ARNOLD & PORTER, PASSAGE OF THE 
ECONOMIC GROWTH ACT MODIFIES THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND PROVIDES OTHER FINANCIAL 
REGULATORY RELIEF (June 1, 2018), 
https://www.arnoldporter.com/en/perspectives/publications/2018/06/passage-of-the-
economic-growth-act-modifies [https://perma.cc/C96T-ATDK] (noting President Trump 
signed the EGRRCPA into law on May 24, 2018).     
63. Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, Pub. L. No. 94-200, 89 Stat. 1124 (1975). 
64. See generally Partial Exemptions from the Requirements of the Home Mortgage 
Disclosure Act Under the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection 
Act (Regulation C), 83 Fed. Reg. 45325 (Sept. 7, 2018), 
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2018-09-07/pdf/2018-19244.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/EW5A-X4Z4] (clarifying the partial exemptions from HDMA reporting 
requirements for certain insured depository institutions and insured credit unions).   
65. See Katie Rodgers, 2 Bosses Show Up to Lead the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/27/us/politics/cfpb-
leandra-english-mulvaney.html [https://perma.cc/5X67-KQA7] (chronicling the change in 
CFPB leadership following Director Cordray’s resignation).    
66. Id.    
67. See English v. Trump, 279 F. Supp. 3d. 307, 311–12 (D.D.C. 2018) (denying Deputy 
Director English’s request for a temporary restraining order to prevent the President from 
designating Mulvaney to serve as acting Director of the CFPB). 
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notably less aggressive approach to the agency’s regulatory mandate.68  
After Mulvaney left his position as Acting Director to become President 
Trump’s Acting Chief of Staff in December 2018,69 Trump appointed 
Kathleen Kraninger to be the CFPB’s second Director.70  Director 
Kraninger led the Bureau for the remainder of Trump’s term until she was 
asked to resign by President Biden on his first day in office.71 
In addition to political sparring over the CFPB’s independence, 
the Bureau faced many legal challenges to its Director’s for-cause 
removal protection before the Supreme Court finally condemned the 
structure in Seila Law.72  Parties facing enforcement actions or penalties 
levied by the CFPB often sought relief in federal court, arguing the CFPB 
was unconstitutionally structured and thus had no authority to impose 
fines or enforce consumer protection laws.73  However, no plaintiff had 
 
68. See CORDRAY, supra note 19, at 206 (“Mulvaney ultimately stayed about a year, mainly 
focusing on public relations stunts.  But during his time, he adopted a philosophy of 
government inaction to slow the pace of enforcement and regulation, declaring that the bureau 
would no longer ‘push the envelope’ to protect consumers.”). Cordray also asserts that after 
Mulvaney assumed leadership of the CFPB, “several existing investigations were closed, and 
some cases were dropped.  Id.  Others were completed but produced what appeared to be more 
lenient results and less money back for consumers, which some observers dubbed the 
‘Mulvaney discount.’”  Id.  See also Nicholas Confessore, Mick Mulvaney’s Master Class in 
Destroying a Bureaucracy from Within, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Apr. 16, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/16/magazine/consumer-financial-protection-bureau-
trump.html [https://perma.cc/2M9C-EYPU] (chronicling the dramatically less-rigorous 
enforcement of consumer protection regulations under Mulvaney’s leadership than under 
Director Cordray).    
69. Michael Tackett & Maggie Haberman, Trump Names Mick Mulvaney Acting Chief of 
Staff, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/14/us/politics/mick-
mulvaney-trump-chief-of-staff.html [https://perma.cc/B8W9-BX23].  
70. Katy O’Donnell, Senate Confirms Trump Nominee Kraninger to Lead Consumer 
Bureau, POLITICO (Dec. 6, 2018, 2:42 PM), 
https://www.politico.com/story/2018/12/06/senate-confirms-kraninger-cfpb-1006095 
[https://perma.cc/5PED-9JAX]. 
71. See Jesse Hamilton, Trump Consumer Watchdog Kraninger Steps Down at Biden’s 
Request, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 20, 2021, 2:06 PM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-01-20/trump-consumer-watchdog-
kraninger-steps-down-at-biden-s-request [https://perma.cc/435X-7D9D] (reporting that 
Director Kraninger resigned from her position “according to the wishes of President Joe 
Biden”).  
72. See infra n.73. 
73. See generally Morgan Drexen, Inc. v. CFPB, 979 F. Supp. 2d 104 (D.D.C. Cir. 2013) 
(seeking injunctive relief against CFPB civil investigative demand); State Nat. Bank of Big 
Spring v. Lew, 958 F. Supp. 2d 127 (D.D.C. 2013) (arguing against the Bureau’s 
constitutionality); CFPB v. Morgan Drexen, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1082 (C.D. Cal. 2014) 
(challenging a CFPB complaint on separation-of-powers grounds); CFPB v. Future Income 
Payments, LLC, 252 F. Supp. 3d 961 (C.D. Cal. 2017) (challenging CFPB civil investigative 
demand on separation-of-powers grounds).  
378 NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE [Vol. 25 
succeeded on such a claim until 2016 in PHH Corp. v. CFPB.74  In that 
case, PHH Corporation (“PHH”), a large home mortgage lender, was 
ordered to disgorge $6.5 million in profits after a CFPB administrative 
law judge determined PHH had violated the Real Estate Settlement 
Procedures Act (“RESPA”) by accepting kickbacks from mortgage 
insurers.75  However, then-CFPB Director Richard Cordray overturned 
the administrative judge’s determination on statutory interpretation 
grounds and increased PHH’s disgorgement  to $109 million.76  In a 
majority opinion written by then-Judge Kavanaugh, the D.C. Circuit 
found the Director’s for-cause removal protection an unconstitutional 
separation-of-powers violation and severed the provision from Dodd-
Frank.77  However, the D.C. Circuit later reviewed the case en banc and 
reversed, holding the Director’s for-cause removal protection was 
constitutional;78 the reversal elicited a strong dissent from Judge 





74. PHH Corp. v. CFPB, 839 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2016), rev’d en banc, 881 F.3d 75 (D.C. 
Cir. 2018).   
75. PHH Corp., 839 F.3d at 11–12. 
76. Id.; see also CORDRAY, supra note 19, at 182 (referring to PHH Corp. as “an usually 
complex case with a tortured history” and to the disputed statutory interpretation issues as a 
“constellation of uncertainties [that] created a perfect storm of controversy surrounding the 
case”).     
77. PHH Corp., 839 F.3d at 39.  
78. PHH Corp. v. CFPB, 881 F.3d 75, 77 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (en banc).  
79. See id. at 165–66, (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“No independent agency exercising 
substantial executive authority has ever been headed by a single person.  Until now. . . . 
.Beacuse the CFPB is an independent agency headed by a single Director and not by a multi-
member commission, the Director of the CFPB possesses more unilateral authority—that is, 
authority to take action on one’s own, subject to no check—than any single commissioner or 
board member in any other independent agency in the U.S. government.  Indeed, other than 
the President, the Director enjoyes more unilateral authority than any other official in any of 
the three branches of government.  That combination—power that is massive in scope, 
concentrated in a single person, and unaccountable to the President—triggers the important 
constitutional question at issue in this case.”).  Some federal courts subsequently agreed with 
Judge Kavanaugh and rejected the en banc D.C. Circuit’s reasoning in PHH Corp.  See, e.g., 
CFPB v. RD Legal Funding, LLC, 332 F. Supp. 3d 729, 784 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (holding the 
CFPB’s single-director structure unconstitutional).  But see CFPB v. All Am. Check Cashing, 
No. 3:16-cv-356-WHB-JCG, 2018 WL 9812125, at *2 (S.D. Miss. March 21, 2018) (“For the 
same reasons stated in PHH Corp., this Court . . . finds that the Bureau is not unconstitutional 
based on its single-director structure.”). 
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IV.  SEILA LAW V. CFPB 
A. Facts and Procedural History 
Seila Law, LLC (“Seila Law”) is a law firm located near Los 
Angeles, California, that operates a debt services practice.80  On February 
27, 2017, the CFPB issued a Civil Investigative Demand (“CID” or the 
“Demand”)81 to Seila Law to determine whether the firm was “engaging 
in unlawful acts or practices in the advertising, marketing, or sale of debt 
relief services or products.”82  The Demand ordered Seila Law to provide 
the CFPB with documents and information related to its debt relief 
business practices.83  After the CFPB rejected a request by Seila Law to 
set aside this Demand, Seila Law refused to comply, and the CFPB filed 
a district court petition seeking the assistance of the court in enforcing the 
Demand.84  The District Court rejected Seila Law’s argument that the 
CFPB Director’s removal protection was unconstitutional and ordered 
the firm to produce the requested documents and information.85  The 
Ninth Circuit affirmed the demand was enforceable, agreeing with the 
lower court—and the en banc D.C. Circuit in PHH Corp.—that the CFPB 
Director’s removal protection did not violate the constitution.86 
After the Ninth Circuit’s decision, Director Kraninger notified 
 
80. Seila Law’s website describes the firm as a “consumer advocacy law practice” and lists 
“debt resolution” as a practice area.  Practice Area, SEILA LAW LLC, 
http://seilalawfirm.com/practices.html [https://perma.cc/WRJ8-LC8Y] (last visited Feb. 6, 
2021).       
81. The CFPB is authorized to issue CIDs to persons who “may have any information[] 
relevant to a violation” of any law within the CFPB’s enforcement purview.  Dodd-Frank § 
1052, 12 U.S.C. § 5562(c)(1).    
82. CFPB v. Seila Law LLC, No. 8:17-cv-01081, 2017 WL 6536586, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 
25, 2017), aff’d 923 F.3d 680 (9th Cir. 2019), rev’d 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020).  The CFPB sought 
this information to determine whether Seila Law had violated “Sections 1031 and 1036 of the 
Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5531, 5536, 12 U.S.C. § 5481 et 
seq.; the Telemarketing Sales Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 310.1 et seq.; or any other Federal consumer 
financial law.”  Id. 
83. Id. 
84. Petition to Enforce Civ. Investigative Demand, CFPB v. Seila Law LLC, No. 8:17-cv-
01081, 2017 WL 6536586, (C.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2017). 
85. Seila Law, 2017 WL 6536586, at *6. 
86. CFPB v. Seila Law LLC, 923 F.3d 680, 682–84 (9th Cir. 2019), aff’g 2017 WL 
6536586 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2017), rev’d 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020).  The Ninth Circuit noted 
“[t]he arguments for and against [the constitutionality of the CFPB Director’s for-cause 
removal protection] have been thoroughly canvassed in the majority, concurring, and 
dissenting opinions in [the D.C. Circuit’s PHH Corp. decision],” and saw “no need to re-play 
the same ground here.”  Id. at 682 (internal citations omitted).  The Court also found 
Humphrey’s Executor and Morrison “controlling,” noting that “[t]he Supreme Court is of 
course free to revisit those precedents, but we are not.”  Id. at 684.     
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congressional leaders that the CFPB now viewed the Director’s for-cause 
removal protection as unconstitutional,87 a reversal from its position in 
the lower courts.88  Thus, after the Supreme Court granted certiorari, the 
Solicitor General argued on the Bureau’s behalf against the 
constitutionality of the CFPB Director’s removal protection.89  The 
Court, in turn, appointed Paul D. Clement as amicus curiae to represent 
the Director’s for-cause removal protection and the Ninth Circuit’s 
holding before the Court.90 
B. Holding and Majority’s Reasoning 
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision, holding 
“the CFPB’s leadership by a single individual removeable only for 
inefficiency, neglect, or malfeasance violates the separation of powers.”91  
Furthermore, the Court found this unconstitutional provision severable 
from the rest of Dodd-Frank.92  Chief Justice Roberts wrote for the 
majority, joined by Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh, 
with regards to the unconstitutionality of the CFPB Director’s for-cause 
removal protection.93  However, Justice Thomas also filed a concurrence, 
joined by Justice Gorsuch, that dissented from the Chief Justice’s 
 
87. See Letter from Kathleen L. Kraninger, Dir., Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, to Mitch 
McConnell, Maj. Leader, U.S. Senate 1 (Sept. 17, 2019), 
https://www.consumerfinancemonitor.com/wp-
content/uploads/sites/14/2019/09/McConnell-letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/U7A2-PB9G] 
(noting the CFPB “has determined that the for-cause removal provision . . . is 
unconstitutional”); see also Letter from Kathleen L. Kraninger, Dir., Consumer Fin. Prot. 
Bureau, to Nancy Pelosi, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives 1 (Sept. 17, 2019), 
https://www.consumerfinancemonitor.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/14/2019/09/Pelosi-
letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/4KR9-G99U] (noting that the CFPB had determined the 
Director’s removal protection unconstitutional).      
88. See Brief of Appellee CFPB at 11, CFPB v. Seila Law LLC, 923 F.3d 680 (9th Cir. 
2019) (No. 17-56324), 2018 WL 1511440, at *21 (“The [CFPB Director’s] limited removal 
restriction that Seila Law challenges is constitutional under controlling Supreme Court 
precedent because it does not impede the President’s ability to take care that the laws are 
faithfully executed.”). 
89. See Brief for Respondent Supporting Vacatur at 8, Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 
2183 (2020) (No. 19-7), 2019 WL 6727094, at *18 (“Because the statutory restriction on the 
President’s authority to remove the Bureau’s Director is unconstitutional, it should be 
invalidated.”).  
90. Brief for Court Appointed Amicus Curiae in Support of Judgement Below, Seila Law 
LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020) (No. 19-7), 2020 WL 353477. 
91. Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2197 (2020).    
92. Id. at 2211.   
93. See id. at 2191–2211 (majority opinion).  
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severability analysis.94  Justice Kagan filed a dissent, joined by Justices 
Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor.95      
After accepting that “lesser executive officers” are necessary to 
assist the President in faithfully executing his or her Article II powers, 
Roberts asserted that such officers “must remain accountable to the 
President, whose authority they wield.”96  Echoing a long line of 
precedent from Myers v. United States97 through Free Enterprise Fund v. 
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board,98 the Chief Justice 
reasoned that the President’s removal power—although not explicitly 
granted by the Constitution—is necessary to ensure this accountability.99  
After Seila Law, only two exceptions to the general rule that the 
President possesses unrestricted removal power remain—“one for 
multimember expert agencies that do not wield substantial executive 
power, and one for inferior officers with limited duties and no 
policymaking or administrative authority.”100  The first exception flows 
from Humphrey’s Executor v. United States,101  where the Court upheld 
a statutory removal protection for FTC Commissioners that allowed the 
 
94. See id. at 2211–24 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing the Court should deny the CFPB’s 
petion to enforce the CID rather than reach the severability issue).  
95. See id. at 2224–45 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (arguing the Director’s for-cause removal 
protection was not a violation of separation-of-powers doctrine but concurring in the Court’s 
judgment with respect to severability).   
96. Id. at 2197. 
97. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 163–64 (1926) (holding the Constitution 
grants the President “general administrative control of those executing the laws, including the 
power of appointment and removal of executive officers”). 
98. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010).  Congress 
created the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (“PCAOB”) via the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 in response to “celebrated accounting debacles” such as the Enron 
accounting scandal.  Id. at 486.  The PCAOB is vested with regulatory and enforcement 
powers over the accounting industry, with this authority “subject to . . . approval and 
alteration” by the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC” or “Commission”).  Id. at 
485.  As initially designed, the PCAOB was led by a board composed of five members, each 
appointed to staggered 5-year terms by the SEC.  Id.  However, the SEC could only remove 
a PCAOB member “for good cause shown.”  Id.  The Court held that “the dual for-cause 
limitations on the removal of Board members contravene the Constitution’s separation of 
powers.”  Id. at 492.  In a majority opinion written by Justice Roberts, the Court reasoned: 
“Without a layer of insulation between the Commission and the Board, the Commission could 
remove a Board member at any time, and therefore would be fully responsible for what the 
Board does.  The President could then hold the Commission to account for its supervision of 
the Board, to the same extent that he may hold the Commission to account everything else it 
does.”  Id. at 495–96.                 
99. Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2197–2200.  
100. Id. at 2199–2200.   
101. Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935). 
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President to remove a Commissioner only for “inefficiency, neglect of 
duty, or malfeasance in office”—a removal protection identical to Dodd-
Frank’s for-cause removal protection for the CFPB Director.102  While 
reaffirming the President’s removal power over executive officers, the 
Humphrey’s Executor Court found that the nature of the FTC 
Commissioners’ duties made those officers non-executive and thus 
outside the scope of the President’s unfettered removal authority.103  The 
second exception applies to inferior executive officers104 and stems from 
Morrison v. Olson,105 where the Court upheld for-cause removal 
protection for an independent counsel appointed by the Attorney General, 
reasoning that such a restriction on the President’s power to remove 
inferior executive officers did not “impede the President’s ability to 
perform his constitutional duty.”106 
According to Roberts, the CFPB Director’s for-cause removal 
protection did not fall under either of the two exceptions to unrestricted 
Presidential removal power.107  Unlike the FTC in Humphrey’s Executor, 
the CFPB is led not by a multi-member, non-partisan board, but rather by 
a single Director who is “hardly a mere legislative or judicial aid.”108  The 
 
102. Id. at 620; see also Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
(“Dodd-Frank”) § 1017, 12 U.S.C. § 5491(c)(3) (“The President may remove the Director for 
inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.”).  
103. Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 632.  However, the Humphrey’s Executor Court 
admitted the decision left “for future consideration” a “field of doubt” as to the precise line 
between a purely-executive and non-executive officer.  Id.  Justice Roberts summarized the 
decision as follows: “Humphrey’s Executor permitted Congress to give for-cause removal 
protections to a multimember body of experts, balanced along partisan lines, that performed 
legislative and judicial functions and was said not to exercise any executive power.”  Seila 
Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2199.    
104. Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2199.  Article II distinguishes between principal officers—
required to be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate—and inferior officers 
“whose appointment Congress may vest in the President, courts, or heads of Departments.”  
Id. at 2199, n.3 (citing U.S. CONST. art. II. § 2, cl. 2). 
105. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
106. Id. at 691.  In a lone dissent that somewhat foreshadows the Court’s reasoning in Free 
Enterprise Fund and Seila Law, Justice Scalia rejected the Morrison majority’s holding that 
Congress can prevent the President from removing an inferior executive officer.  Id. at 735 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Today’s decision on the basic issue of fragmentation of executive 
power is ungoverned by rule, and hence ungoverned by law. . . . [I]t fails to explain why it is 
not true that—as the text of the Constitution seems to require, and as our past cases have 
uniformly assumed—all purely executive power must be under the control of the President.” 
(citation omitted)).    
107. Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2200–01. 
108. Id. at 2200.  Justice Roberts described the CFPB Director as follows: “Instead of 
making reports and recommendations to Congress, as the 1935 FTC did, the Director 
possesses the authority to promulgate binding rules fleshing out 19 federal statutes, including 
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CFPB Director is outside the scope of the Morrison exception as well 
because Dodd-Frank mandates that the Director be appointed by the 
President and confirmed by the Senate,109 making the Director a 
principal—not inferior—executive officer.110  Therefore, the Court 
determined the CFPB Director’s for-cause removal protection was 
“incompatible with our constitutional structure.”111   
After determining that neither exception to the President’s 
unrestricted removal power applied, the Court explained that the CFPB’s 
single-director structure violated the Constitution’s separation of powers 
“by vesting significant governmental power in the hands of a single 
individual accountable to no one.”112  Roberts explained further: 
 
The Director is neither elected by the people nor 
meaningfully controlled (through the threat of removal) 
by someone who is.  The Director does not even depend 
on Congress for annual appropriations. . . . Yet the 
Director may unilaterally, without meaningful 
supervision, issue final regulations, oversee 
adjudications, set enforcement priorities, initiate 
prosecutions, and determine what penalties to impose on 
private parties.  With no colleagues to persuade, and no 
boss or electorate looking over her shoulder, the Director 
may dictate and enforce policy for a vital segment of the 
economy affecting millions of Americans.113 
 
Because the Director is appointed to a five-year term, it was possible that 
a single-term President would be denied any opportunity to appoint a 
 
a broad prohibition on unfair and deceptive practices in a major segment of the U.S. economy.  
And instead of submitting recommended dispositions to an Article III court, the Director may 
unilaterally issue final decisions awarding legal and equitable relief in administrative 
adjudications.  Finally, the Director’s enforcement authority includes the power to seek 
daunting monetary penalties against private parties on behalf of the United States in federal 
court—a quintessentially executive power not considered in Humphrey’s Executor.”  Id. 
109. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) § 
1011, 12 U.S.C. § 5491(b)(2).  
110. Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2200. 
111. Id. at 2201. 
112. Id. at 2203. 
113. Id. at 2204. 
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CFPB Director under the original provision.114  The Court found this 
problem was exacerbated by the CFPB’s funding arrangement.115  The 
President can normally exert at least some measure of control over 
independent agencies via checks on the congressional appropriations 
process such as the veto power.116  However, the President was deprived 
of this control over the CFPB because the Bureau is funded by the Federal 
Reserve, which is itself not funded via congressional appropriation.117  
Thus, the CFPB’s “financial freedom makes it even more likely that the 
agency will ‘slip from the Executive’s control, and thus from that of the 
people.’”118  
After finding the CFPB Director’s for-cause removal protection 
unconstitutional, the Court determined the provision was severable from 
Dodd-Frank.119  However, the Court remanded to the Ninth Circuit to 
decide the question of whether the CFPB’s civil investigative demand 
issued to Seila Law while the Bureau was unconstitutionally structured 






114. Id.  Roberts offered this hypothetical: “A President elected in 2020 would likely not 
appoint a CFPB Director until 2023, and a President elected in 2028 may never appoint one.  
That means an unlucky President might get elected on a consumer-protection platform and 
enter office only to find herself saddled with a holdover Director from a competing political 
party who is dead set against that agenda.  To make matters worse, the agency’s single-
Director structure means the President will not have the opportunity to appoint any other 
leaders—such as a chair or fellow members of a Commission or Board—who can serve as a 
check on the Director’s authority and help bring the agency in line with the President’s 
preferred policies.”  Id.   
115. Id.  
116. Id. 
117. Id. 
118. See id. (quoting Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 499 
(2010)).  
119. Id. at 2207–11.  Dodd-Frank’s express severability clause states: “If any provision of 
this Act, an amendment made by this Act, or the application of such provision or amendment 
to any person or circumstance is held to be unconstitutional, the remainder of this Act, the 
amendments made by this Act, and the application of the provisions of such to any person or 
circumstance shall not be affected thereby.”  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) § 3, 12 U.S.C. § 5302. 
120. Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2211.   
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V.  IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CFPB GOING FORWARD 
A. Seila Law Affirms the Constitutionality of the CFPB 
The Court’s holding in Seila Law was certainly a victory for the 
CFPB’s critics who have argued since the agency’s creation that the 
Director’s for-cause removal protection was unconstitutional.121  
However, rather than deliver a fatal blow to the agency, the decision 
actually validates the constitutionality of the Bureau’s existence and its 
regulatory powers generally.122  Indeed, the Court specifically held that 
the Bureau “may continue to exist and operate notwithstanding Congress’ 
unconstitutional attempt to insulate the agency’s Director from removal 
by the President.”123  Supporters of the CFPB pointed to this language 
immediately after the Court’s decision was issued as support for the 
notion that constitutional attacks to the CFPB’s statutory mandate and 
existence generally are now foreclosed.124 
B. CFPB Ratification  
The Court remanded to the Ninth Circuit to determine the 
ratification issue; however, the CFPB’s rules and regulations issued while 
the Bureau was unconstitutionally structured remain in full effect.125  
Shortly after the Court issued its Seila Law decision, Director Kraninger 
 
121. See, e.g., Brief Amici Curiae of Twenty-Seven Members of the U.S. House of 
Representatives in Support of Petitioner, Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020) 
(No. 19-7), 2019 WL 6875540 (Republican members of Congress including Kevin McCarthy, 
Patrick McHenry, and Stephen Scalise argued the Director’s for-cause removal protection 
was unconstitutional.); see also Amicus Brief of U.S. Senators Mike Lee et al. Supporting 
Petitioner, Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020) (No. 19-7), 2019 WL 7168613 
(Republican Senators Mike Lee, James Lankford, and M. Michael Rounds also argued against 
the constitutionality of the CFPB Director’s for-cause removal protection.). 
122. Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2209 (“The only constitutional defect we have identified in 
the CFPB’s structure is the Director’s insulation from removal.  If the Director were 
removable at will by the President, the constitutional violation would disappear.”). 
123. Id. at 2207–08. 
124. See Elizabeth Warren (@SenWarren), TWITTER (June 29, 2020, 11:05 AM), 
https://twitter.com/SenWarren/status/1277619172042846208 [https://perma.cc/PW2A-
D4V9] (“Let’s not lose sight of the bigger picture: after years of industry attacks and GOP 
opposition, a conservative Supreme Court recognized what we all knew: the @CFPB itself 
and the law that created it is constitutional.  The CFPB is here to stay.”); see also Richard 
Cordray, Why the CFPB’s Loss at the Supreme Court Is Really a Win, WASH. POST (June 29, 
2020, 6:20 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/06/29/why-cfpbs-loss-
supreme-court-is-really-win/ [https://perma.cc/XQ47-AYUW] (describing the decision as “a 
sheep that comes in wolf’s clothing”).  
125. Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2211. 
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issued a “Ratification of Bureau Actions” (“Ratification Notice”) 
purporting to ratify nearly all regulatory actions the CFPB took from 
January 4, 2012 to June 30, 2020.126  This Ratification Notice was an 
attempt to protect “existing reliance interests by avoiding doubt as to the 
validity of the actions following the Court’s decision in Seila Law”127 and 
predictably succeeded in that goal based on the Ninth Circuit’s previous 
ruling on a similar CFPB ratification issue in CFPB v. Gordon.128  That 
case arose after President Obama installed Richard Cordray as the first 
CFPB Director via recess appointment in January 2012, and the Supreme 
Court determined in NLRB v. Noel Canning129 that such a recess 
appointment was unconstitutional.130  Director Cordray was reappointed 
by the President and confirmed by the Senate in July 2013, then issued a 
“Notice of Ratification” (“Cordray Ratification”) that purported to ratify 
all actions taken while Cordray was Director but before he had been 
approved by the Senate.131  Afterwards, an attorney subject to a Bureau 
enforcement action challenged the action on grounds that it had not been 
validly ratified, but the Ninth Circuit held the Cordray Ratification 
adequately validated all of the Bureau’s regulatory actions while Cordray 
 
126. Ratification of Bureau Actions, 85 Fed. Reg. 41330 (July 7, 2020).  All CFPB rules 
and regulations published in the Federal Register covered by this ratification, with only two 
exceptions: Arbitration Agreements, 82 Fed. Reg. 33210 (July 19, 2017), and Payday, 
Vehicle, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 82 Fed. Reg. 54472 (Nov. 17, 2017).  The 
first exception—Arbitration Agreements—was invalidated by a joint resolution of Congress 
and the President prior to the rule’s compliance date.  Pub. L. No. 115–74, 131 Stat. 1243 
(2017).  The validity of the second excepted rule—Payday, Vehicle, and Certain High-Cost 
Installment Loans—is currently being litigated and its compliance date has been stayed.  
Order, Cmty. Fin. Servs. Ass’n of Am., Ltd. v. CFPB, No. 1:18-cv-00295 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 
6, 2018).  The CFPB “has revoked the mandatory underwriting provisions” and “separately 
ratified the payment provisions” of that rule.  85 Fed. Reg. 41331.  The Ratification Notice 
contains a severability clause: “In the event that the Bureau’s ratifying of any individual 
Ratified Action or the application of this ratification to any person or circumstance is held to 
be invalid for any reason, the remainder of this ratification is severable and shall continue in 
force.”  85 Fed. Reg. 41330.      
127. Director Kraninger’s decision to ratify was “reinforced by the fact that, based on the 
Bureau’s experience as a regulator of markets for consumer financial products and services, 
the Director is acutely aware that many of the Ratified Actions have engendered significant 
reliance interests.  Consumers, the business community, State and local governments, and 
other individuals and entities have all relied upon the validity of the Ratified Actions in 
organizing their activities.”  Ratification of Bureau Actions, 85 Fed. Reg. at 41330. 
128. CFPB v. Gordon, 819 F.3d 1179, 1198 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding the CFPB Director 
validly ratified all actions taken before being confirmed to the position by the Senate).      
129. NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513 (2014). 
130. Id. at 519. 
131. Notice of Ratification, 78 Fed. Reg. 53734 (Aug. 30, 2013).   
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was unconstitutionally seated.132  Given that Seila Law was remanded to 
the Ninth Circuit to decide a similar ratification issue—and that the Ninth 
Circuit sitting en banc originally found no issue with the CFPB Director’s 
for-cause removal protection—it was highly likely that the CFPB’s 
regulations would remain fully intact.133  As expected, the Ninth Circuit 
found that the Ratification Notice issued by Director Kraninger in the 
wake of the Seila Law decision sufficiently ratified all covered Bureau 
actions, allowing all existing CFPB rules and regulations to remain in 
force.134 
The Ninth Circuit was also tasked with determining “whether the 
civil investigative demand was validly ratified” and thus enforceable 
against Seila Law LLC.135  The CFPB’s Ratification Notice did not 
explicitly ratify pending enforcement actions; the Bureau instead chose 
to “mak[e] such ratifications separately” as appropriate136 and argued it 
had already done so twice for the CID issued to Seila Law LLC.137  
Although the CID was originally issued by Director Cordray in early 
2017—while Director Cordray was unconstitutionally insulated from 
Presidential removal—Acting Director Mick Mulvaney issued a 
“Decision Memorandum” (“Mulvaney Ratification”) on March 16, 2018, 
formally ratifying the Bureau’s enforcement action against Seila Law 
LLC.138  Director Kraninger issued a similar ratification (“Kraninger 
 
132. Gordon, 819 F.3d at 1192 (“Because the CFPB had the authority to bring the action 
at the time Gordon was charged, Cordray’s August 2013 Ratification, done after he was 
properly appointed as Director, resolved any Appointments Clause deficiencies.”).  
133. See CFPB v. Seila Law LLC, 923 F.3d 680, 682–84 (9th Cir. 2019) (holding the CFPB 
Director’s for-cause removal did not violate the separation of powers).  
134. See CFPB v. Seila Law LLC, 984 F.3d 715, 719 (9th Cir. 2020) (holding the CID was 
validly ratified and thus enforceable against Seila Law because “[j]ust as in Gordon, the 
constitutional infirmity relates to the Director alone, not to the legality of the agency itself”).       
135. Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2211 (2020).  The Court declined to address 
the ratification issue because “[t]hat debate turns on case-specific factual and legal questions 
not addressed below and not briefed here.”  Id. at 2208.  
136. Ratification of Bureau Actions, 85 Fed. Reg. 41330, 41330 (July 10, 2020). 
137. Supplemental Brief of Appellee Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau at 12, CFPB v. Seila 
Law, LLC, 984 F.3d 715 (9th Cir. 2020) (“Seila Law has received exactly what it claimed 
was lacking, and received it twice: Two officials who were indisputably accountable to the 
President have confirmed that this case should proceed.”). 
138. Appellee Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau Correspondence Regarding Ratification at 8, 
CFPB v. Seila Law LLC, 984 F.3d 715 (9th Cir. 2020).  The Mulvaney Ratification states: “I 
ratify the Bureau’s earlier decisions to issue the February 27, 2017, civil investigate demand 
(CID) to Seila Law, LLC; to deny Seila Law’s request to set aside the CID in an order dated 
April 10, 2017; and to file a petition on June 22, 2017 requesting the district court enforce the 
CID.”  Id.  
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Ratification”) on July 9, 2020, shortly after Seila Law was decided.139  
The Mulvaney and Kraninger Ratifications were issued while both 
Mulvaney (as an Acting Director) and Kraninger (as a post-Seila Law 
Director) were removable by the President at will.140  Thus, because the 
issuance of the CID was within the CFPB’s enumerated powers and 
because it was ratified twice by Directors removable by the President at 
will, the Ninth Circuit found Seila Law had no effect on pending CFPB 
enforcement actions after they were found to be validly ratified by 
Director Kraninger.141 
C. CFPB Director Under the Biden Administration 
In a swift exercise of the President’s new unrestricted power to 
remove the CFPB Director at will, even for political reasons alone,142 
President Joseph Biden removed Director Kraninger within hours of his 
inauguration on January 20, 2021.143  Biden then named David Uejio, 
formerly the CFPB’s Chief Strategy Officer, as Acting Director of the 
Bureau,144 and is expected to nominate FTC Commissioner Rohit Chopra 
to serve as Director Kraninger’s permanent replacement.145  While these 
 
139. Id. at 7.  Director Kraninger’s ratification states: “I hereby ratify the decisions to issue 
the civil investigative demand to Seila Law, to deny Seila Law’s request to modify or set aside 
the CID, and to file a petition requesting that the district court enforce the CID.”  Id.   
140. Supplemental Brief of Appellee Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau at 14, CFPB v. Seila Law 
LLC, 984 F.3d 715 (9th Cir. 2020); Supplemental Brief of Respondent-Appellant Seila Law, 
LLC at 8, CFPB v. Seila Law LLC, 984 F.3d 715 (9th Cir. 2020). 
141. CFPB v. Seila Law LLC, 984 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 2020).   
142. Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2211 (2020). 
143.  See Hamilton, supra note 71 (reporting that Director Kraninger resigned from her 
position “according to the wishes of President Joe Biden”); see also Kathleen Kraninger 
(@CFPBKraninger), TWITTER (Jan. 20, 2021, 12:46 PM), 
https://twitter.com/CFPBKraninger/status/1351949184883163138?s=20 
[https://perma.cc/H5XU-MEW7] (“As requested by the Biden administration, today I 
resigned as Director of the CFPB.”).  
144. See Kate Berry, Former Cordray Aide Selected for Interim CFPB Post, AM. BANKER 
(Jan. 22, 2021, 2:18 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/former-cordray-aide-
selected-for-interim-cfpb-post [https://perma.cc/7S4T-UCN4] (noting Ueijo “worked for five 
years as chief strategy officer and briefly as chief of staff to former CFPB Director Richard 
Cordray”).  
145. See Andrew Ackerman & Andrew Restuccia, Biden to Pick Rohit Chopra to Lead 
Consumer-Finance Agency, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 18, 2021, 11:24 AM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/biden-expected-to-nominate-rohit-chopra-to-head-consumer-
financial-protection-bureau-11610933184 [https://perma.cc/P8NX-53NC] (reporting 
President Biden’s intentions to nominate Chopra, the CFPB’s student-loan ombudsman 
during the Obama administration). 
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moves were not unexpected,146 the speed with which President Biden 
acted in deposing Director Kraninger is a stark illustration of the 
unfettered removal authority sanctioned by the Court in Seila Law.147         
The Obama and Trump administrations differered greatly in their 
approaches towards the CFPB’s regulatory and enforcement activities, 
and the Biden administration could alter the Bureau’s activities yet 
again.148  For example, the CFPB announced fifty-five public law 
enforcement actions in 2015, compared to just eleven in 2018149 and 
twenty-two in 2019.150  Moreover, the Bureau awarded an average of 
$59.6 million in relief per case under Director Cordray, compared to an 
average of $2.4 million per case under Director Kraninger—a decline of 
approximately 96% in average monetary relief awarded per enforcement 
action.151  Levels of CFPB enforcement of regulations relating to 
mortgage lending, student loans, and deceptive or abusive practices all 
 
146. See, e.g., Robert Schmidt & Jesse Hamilton, Wall Street Frets Over a Revived CFPB 
Trump Left Toothless, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 8, 2020, 2:00 AM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-12-08/wall-street-frets-over-a-revival-of-
cfpb-left-toothless-by-trump [https://perma.cc/GX42-VWBM] (“The banking industry has 
reason to fear that a new chief will return the agency to its days of meting out stiff sanctions 
on lenders and credit card companies.”); see also Chris Arnold, Financial Watchdog Expected 
To Get Its Teeth Back Under Biden, NPR (Nov. 18, 2020, 6:01 AM), 
https://www.npr.org/2020/11/18/935470357/financial-watchdog-expected-to-get-its-teeth-
back-under-biden [https://perma.cc/KCM6-B6AD] (discussing how the CFPB could increase 
enforcement activity under a Director nominated by President Biden).  
147. Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2211 (2020); see also Editorial Board, 
Editorial, Biden Learns to Love Brett Kavanaugh, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 21, 2021, 6:50 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/biden-learns-to-love-brett-kavanaugh-
11611273011?mod=hp_opin_pos_3 [https://perma.cc/Z8C9-P7SB] (arguing Biden’s actions 
show that “Democrats are finally appreciating Justice Brett Kavanaugh and the unitary 
executive”).  
148. See Tory Newmyer, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Muzzled Under Trump, 
Prepares to Renew Tough Industry Oversight, WASH. POST (Jan. 27, 2021, 6:00 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2021/01/27/cfpb-rohit-chopra-biden/ 
[https://perma.cc/U9JA-CSDY] (“Beyond reasserting the agency’s role as the federal cop on 
the consumer beat, the Biden-era CFPB is set to psuh a number of rule changes to retighten 
screws on corporate interests.”).  
149. CHRISTOPHER L. PETERSON, CONSUMER FED’N OF AM., DORMANT: THE CONSUMER 
FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU’S LAW ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM IN DECLINE 2 (2019), 
https://consumerfed.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/CFPB-Enforcement-in-Decline.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5FS8-V7FS].   
150. Enforcement Actions, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, 
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/enforcement/actions/?title=&from_date=01%2F01%2F2
019&to_date=12%2F30%2F2019 [https://perma.cc/B855-HTDP] (last visited Dec. 10, 
2020).   
151. PETERSON, supra note 149, at 2. 
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sharply declined during the Trump Administration.152  Many have 
predicted that a Biden-appointed CFPB Director will not only reverse 
these trends, but also could increase attention to fair-lending issues in an 
effort to combat discrimination and promote racial equity causes,153 and 
could enact stricter rules surrounding account overdraft fees, which 
generated over $17 billion in revenue for banks in 2019.154 
VI.  IMPLICATIONS FOR OTHER FINANCIAL REGULATORY AGENCIES 
A. FHFA Director 
The Seila Law majority denounced the CFPB’s structure as 
“almost wholly unprecedented”155 and “an innovation with no foothold 
in history or tradition.”156  According to Chief Justice Roberts, “[a]fter 
years of litigating the agency’s constitutionality,” only four examples of 
for-cause removal protection granted “to principal officers who wield 
power alone rather than as members of a board or commission” could be 
identified.157  The Court distinguished those agency leadership positions 
 
152. Id. at 2–3.   
153. See Kate Berry, Acting CFPB Chief Signals Tougher Stance Against Redlining, AM. 
BANKER (Feb. 3, 2021, 9:00 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/acting-cfpb-chief-
signals-tougher-stance-against-redlining [https://perma.cc/7W3P-3XH4] (“Banking 
attorneys are bracing for an immediate sea change in the [CFPB’s] approach to fair-lending 
cases even before the Biden administration’s nominee to run the agency is confirmed.”).  
154.  See Schmidt & Hamilton, supra note 146 (“Wall Street is also expecting the regulator 
to review the controversial, though lucrative, practice of overdraft fees.”); see also COREY 
STONE ET AL., OLIVER WYMAN, BEYOND OVERDRAFT 5 (2020), 
https://www.oliverwyman.com/content/dam/oliver-
wyman/v2/publications/2020/jul/Beyond-Overdraft-Report-Finalpdf.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/SNF2-BFZ2] (“In 2019, consumer overdraft-related fees generated $17 
billion of revunes for the [banking] industry and represented 66 percent of consumer deposit-
related fees for the nation’s largest banks . . . .”); PETER SMITH ET AL., CENTER FOR 
RESPONSIBLE LENDING, OVERDRAFT FEES 1 (2020), 
https://www.responsiblelending.org/sites/default/files/nodes/files/research-publication/crl-
overdraft-covid19-jun2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/R9NF-CBNE] (“[B]anks with assets of $1 
billion or more charged customers $11.68 billion in overdraft-related fees” in 2019, 
representing “an increase of $130 million over the 2018 total.”).   
155. Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2201 (2020). 
156. Id. at 2202. 
157. Id. at 2201.  First, the Comptroller of the Currency was protected by a for-cause 
removal limitation “for one year during the Civil War.  That example has rightly been 
dismissed as an aberration.”  Id.  Today, the Comptroller serves a five-year term “unless 
sooner removed by the President, upon reasons to be communicated by him to the Senate.”  
12 U.S.C. § 2.  After Seila Law, it is clear that under the OCC’s current structure, any President 
“in a firing mood” may remove the comptroller at will.  Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2232 (Kagan, 
J., dissenting).  Second, the Office of the Special Counsel (“OSC”), a government entity 
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from the CFPB Director as “not involv[ing] regulatory or enforcement 
authority remotely comparable to that exercised by the CFPB.”158  
However, one of those four examples, in particular—the Director of the 
Federal Housing Finance Agency (“FHFA”)—deserves a closer look in 
the new post-Seila Law constitutional order.159 
The FHFA was created by the Housing and Economic Recovery 
Act (“HERA”)160 in response to the 2008 financial crisis.161  An 
independent executive agency,162 the FHFA regulates the Federal 
National Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”) and the Federal Home 
Loan Mortgage Corporation (“Freddie Mac”), government-sponsored 
entities (“GSEs”) specifically enumerated by statute.163  Like the CFPB, 
the FHFA is led by a single director who is appointed to a five-year term 
by the President, subject to Senate confirmation, and can only be removed 
by the President “for cause.”164  Also similar to the CFPB, the FHFA is 
not funded via congressional appropriation, but through “annual 
assessments” collected from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the course 
 
separate from the Independent Counsel at issue in Morrison, has been led by a single director 
with for-cause removal protection since 1978.  Id. at 2201.  Roberts dismissed a comparison 
to the CFPB Director because “the OSC exercises only limited jurisdiction to enforce certain 
rules governing Federal Government employers and employees,” and “does not bind private 
parties at all or wield regulatory authority comparable to the CFPB.”  Id. at 2202.  Third, the 
Social Security Administration (“SSA”) has been headed by a single Administrator since 
1994, yet “unlike the CFPB, the SSA lacks the authority to bring enforcement actions against 
private parties” and “is largely limited to adjudicating claims for Social Security benefits.”  
Id.  The FHFA was the fourth example identified by the Court.  Id.         
158. Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2202. 
159. Id. 
160. Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (“HERA”), Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122 
Stat. 2654. 
161. Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at  2202. 
162. HERA § 1101, 12 U.S.C. § 4511(a) (“There is established the Federal Housing 
Finance Agency, which shall be an independent agency of the Federal Government.”); see 
also 44 U.S.C. § 3502(5) (including the FHFA in a list of “independent regulatory 
agenc[ies]”).  
163. HERA § 1101, 12 U.S.C. § 4511(b)(1)–(2).  Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are 
classified as “regulated entit[ies]” subject to the FHFA Director’s “general regulatory 
authority” as set forth in the HERA.  Id.    
164. Id. § 4512(b)(1)–(2).  The statutory language of the FHFA Director’s for-cause 
removal protection is less specific than was the CFPB Director’s removal protection.  
Compare id. § 4512(b)(2) (“The [FHFA] Director shall be appointed for a term of 5 years, 
unless removed before the end of such term for cause by the President.”), with Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) § 1011, 12 U.S.C. § 
5491(c)(3) (allowing the President to remove the CFPB Director only “for inefficiency, 
neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office”).    
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of the agency’s supervisory activities.165  The FHFA is “advise[d]” by the 
Federal Housing Finance Oversight Board, composed of the FHFA 
Director, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Housing and 
Urban Development, and the SEC Chairman.166  This Board is 
distinguishable from the multimember commissions that lead the Federal 
Reserve, the SEC, and other agencies, as the Board has no binding 
authority over the FHFA or its Director.167      
The FHFA Director also possesses regulatory and enforcement 
powers.168  The FHFA Director is instructed to “issue any regulations, 
guidelines, or orders necessary” to ensure the safety and soundness of 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.169  The Director may bring enforcement 
actions against “a regulated entity or any entity-affiliated party” for any 
“unsafe or unsound practice” or violations of law.170  The FHFA Director 
may issue subpoenas and cease-and-desist orders,171 require Fannie Mae 
or Freddie Mac to take remedial action,172 and impose civil penalties on 
regulated entities of up to $2 million per day for each day that a violation 
continues.173  However, unlike the CFPB, the FHFA may only regulate 
the GSEs specifically enumerated in the HERA; the agency has no 
authority over private parties or the housing and mortgage markets.174   
The Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, ruled in 2019 in Collins v. 
Mnuchin175 that the FHFA Director’s for-cause removal protection was 
 
165. HERA § 1106, 12 U.S.C. § 4516.  
166. HERA § 1103, 12 U.S.C. § 4513a(a), (c).   
167. See id. § 4513a(b) (the Board “may not exercise any executive authority, and the 
Director may not delegate to the Board any of the functions, powers, or duties of the 
Director”); see also Collins v. Mnuchin, 938 F.3d 553, 565 (5th Cir. 2019) (en banc) 
(describing the Board’s power as “Lilliputian”). 
168. See infra nn. 169–74. 
169. HERA § 1107, 12 U.S.C. § 4526(a); see also HERA § 1103 § 4513(a)(1)(A)–(B) 
(“The principal duties of the Director shall be (A) to oversee the prudential operations of each 
regulated entity; and (B) to ensure that each regulated entity operates in a safe and sound 
manner” and that “the operations and activities of each regulated entity foster liquid, efficient, 
competitive, and resilient national housing finance markets . . .”).  
170. HERA § 1151, 12 U.S.C. § 4631(a)(1).  The FHFA Director may bring charges for 
“unsafe or unsound practice” if either Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac “receives . . . a less-than-
satisfactory rating for asset quality, management, earnings or liquidity.”  Id. at § 4631(b).     
171. HERA § 1158, 12 U.S.C. § 4641 (subpoena authority); HERA § 1151, 12 U.S.C. § 
4631 (cease-and-desist proceedings); HERA § 1152, 12 U.S.C. § 4632 (temporary cease-and-
desist orders).  
172. HERA § 1151, 12 U.S.C. § 4631(d). 
173. HERA § 1155, 12 U.S.C. § 4636(b)(4).   
174. HERA § 1154, 12 U.S.C. § 4635; HERA § 1155, 12 U.S.C. § 4636. 
175. Collins v. Mnuchin, 938 F.3d 553 (5th Cir. 2019) (en banc). 
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unconstitutional.176  That suit was brought by three Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac shareholders challenging the FHFA’s 2012 financing 
agreement (referred to as the “Net Worth Sweep”)177 as unconstitutional 
in part because the agreement was adopted by a Director not removable 
by the President at will—an argument accepted by the Fifth Circuit.178  
The Fifth Circuit also found the Director’s removal protection provision 
severable from HERA, noting that while the statute does not contain an 
express severability clause, “nothing in the statutory scheme suggests that 
Congress would prefer a complete unwind of actions taken by the FHFA 
to an FHFA director removable at will.”179 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on July 9, 2020, and will 
hear the case in the 2020-21 term.180  In Seila Law, Roberts appeared to 
set the table for a similar ruling on the FHFA’s structure as the Court 
delivered to the CFPB.181  The Chief Justice described the FHFA as 
“essentially a companion of the CFPB, established in response to the 
same financial crisis,” and, citing the Fifth Circuit’s Collins ruling, noted 
that the FHFA’s structure is a “source of ongoing controversy.”182  While 
Roberts did concede that the FHFA “regulates primarily Government-
sponsored enterprises, not purely private actors [as does the CFPB],”183 
the Court will likely set aside this difference and agree with the Fifth 
Circuit’s reasoning because the fundamental constitutional defect—a 
 
176. Id. at 563. 
177. Id. at 567–68.  The Net Worth Sweep “replaced the quarterly 10% dividend [paid to 
Fannie and Freddie shareholders] with variable dividends equal to the GSEs’ entire net worth 
except a capital reserve.”  Id. at 567.  This arrangement “transferred a fortune from Fannie 
and Freddie to Treasury.  When this suit was filed, the GSEs had paid $195 billion in 
dividends under the net worth sweep.”  Id. at 568.    
178. Id. at 591 (“Agencies with removal-protected principal officers were a unique, but 
recognized, blend of legislative, executive, and judicial powers long before the FHFA.  Their 
unique position has also been relatively static, until recently.  The removal-protected FHFA 
Director is a new innovation and falls outside the lines that Humphrey’s Executor recognized.  
Granting both removal protection and full agency leadership to a single FHFA Director 
stretches the independent-agency pattern beyond what the Constitution allows.”).    
179. Id. at 592 (“When addressing the partial unconstitutionality of a statute such as this 
one, we seek to honor Congress’ intent while fixing the problematic aspects of the statute.  
Thus, in this case, the appropriate—and most judicially conservative—remedy is to sever the 
‘for cause’ restriction on removal of the FHFA director from the statute.” (citations omitted)). 
180. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Collins v. Mnuchin, No. 19-563, (U.S. Sept. 25, 
2019).   
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Director of an independent executive agency insulated from the 
President’s at-will removal power—is the same defect that was removed 
from the CFPB’s structure in Seila Law.184 
However, the Court’s decision to hear Collins in light of these 
similarities between the CFPB and FHFA Directorships begs the question 
of why the Court granted certiorari and did not simply endorse the Fifth 
Circuit’s holding as to the unconstitutionality of the FHFA Director’s 
removal protection.185  At oral argument,  Justice Sotomayor explored the 
idea that the FHFA could be distinguished from the CFBP on grounds 
related to the FHFA’s conservatorship powers, which she argued have 
“historically been considered an adjunct to the judicial power,” rather 
than an executive power that may only be exercised by a Director 
removable at will by the President in light of Seila Law.186  However, 
Justices Alito and Kagan appeared to reject this idea, agreeing with the 
government’s position that the FHFA Director’s authority to place Fannie 
and Freddie under conservatorship is an executive power and noting that 
those GSEs have a “profound effect” on the nation’s housing market.187   
Additionally, several Justices expressed significant hesitancy 
towards the shareholders’ argument that if the FHFA Director is indeed 
unconstitutionally insulated from the President’s removal power, the 
Court should in turn invalidate the FHFA’s Net Worth Sweep.188  This 
hesitancy seems grounded in the fact that the FHFA and Treasury 
Department’s Net Worth Sweep resulted in an “astonishing windfall of 
$124 billion” in profit for the federal government.189  At oral argument, 
several Justices questioned whether the Court should even reach the 
constitutional issue of the FHFA Director’s removal protection, focusing 
instead on the fact that the Net Worth Sweep at issue was first enacted by 
an acting director removable at will, as well as underlying corporate law 




186. Oral Argument at 18:30, Collins v. Mnuchin, Nos. 19-422 & 19-563 (U.S. argued 
Dec. 9, 2020), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2020/19-422 [https://perma.cc/LCE4-4KLA]. 
187. Id. at 42:21. 
188. Id. at 01:03:27. 
189. Brief of Patrick J. Collins, et al., at 2, Collins v. Mnuchin, Nos. 19-422 & 19-563 
(U.S. Sept. 16, 2020), 2020 WL 5731206, at *2.  
190. Oral Argument at 5:30, Collins v. Mnuchin, Nos. 19-422 & 19-563 (U.S. argued Dec. 
9, 2020) https://www.oyez.org/cases/2020/19-422 [https://perma.cc/LCE4-4KLA] (Justice 
Thomas questioning counsel for the FHFA on the merits of the government’s business 
judgement arguments and the issue of whether the plaintiffs’ claims were derivate or direct); 
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magnitude of the final agency action at issue, the Court will perhaps use 
Collins to address the thorny issues surrounding an acting director’s 
actions as the leader of an independent executive agency, as well as an 
independent agency’s ratification of an unconstitutionally-insulated 
director’s actions.191 
B. Financial Regulatory Agencies Led by Multimember Boards or 
Commissions 
While the CFPB and FHFA are each led by a single director that 
must be removable at will after Seila Law, the other federal financial 
regulators do not suffer from the same constitutional defect.  The Federal 
Reserve,192 FDIC,193 SEC,194 CFTC,195 and the National Credit Union 
 
id. at 25:45 (Justice Kavanaugh questioning Aaron Nielson, Court-appointed amicus on behalf 
of the FHFA, on the acting Director issue).       
191. See Hannah Lang, Supreme Court Hints FHFA’s Calabria Could Keep Job After All, 
AM. BANKER (Dec. 9, 2020, 4:48 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/supreme-
court-hints-fhfas-calabria-could-keep-job-after-all [https://perma.cc/YC3N-WVYK] (noting 
that the Court “appeared much more focused on the legality of the net worth sweep than the 
constitutionality of the [FHFA’s] structure,” but appeared divided on “whether they should 
apply the Seila Law ruling about the CFPB equally to the FHFA case”); see also Amy Howe, 
Argument Analysis: “Very Hard Questions” in Dispute Over Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac 
Shareholder Suit, SCOTUSBLOG (Dec. 9, 2020, 7:05 PM), 
https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/12/argument-analysis-very-hard-questions-in-dispute-
over-fannie-mae-freddie-mac-shareholder-suit/ [https://perma.cc/T83N-TNK2] (“If the 
justices do conclude that the restrictions on the removal of the FHFA director violate the 
Constitution, they will have to decide what remedy, if any, should be available for that 
violation. . . . Some justices were clearly concerned that striking down the removal restrictions 
could have significant and undesirable ripple effects—calling into question, for example, the 
validity of the Social Security Administration’s leadership structure.”).      
192. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (“Federal Reserve Board”) is 
composed of seven members, appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, that 
serve fourteen-year terms.  12 U.S.C. § 241.  The Chairman is selected by the President from 
the Federal Reserve Board and is nominated (subject to Senate confirmation) to serve a four-
year term.  Id. § 242.      
193. The FDIC is led by a five-member board, which includes the CFPB Director and the 
Comptroller of the Currency; each member of the board is appointed by the President and 
confirmed by the Senate to a six-year term.  12 U.S.C. § 1812(a)(1), (c)(1).  The FDIC 
Chairperson is selected from that group by the President and confirmed by the Senate to a 
five-year term.  Id.  § 1812(b)(1).         
194. The SEC is led by five Commissioners appointed by the President and confirmed by 
the Senate to five-year terms.  15 U.S.C. § 78d(a).  The SEC Chairman is selected by the 
President from the five Commissioners.  Id. 
195. The CFTC is also led by five Commissioners appointed by the President and 
confirmed by the Senate to five-year terms.  7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(2)(A).  The CFTC Chairman is 
appointed by the President from the five Commissioners; the appointment is subject to Senate 
confirmation.  Id. § 2(a)(2)(B).   
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Association (“NCUA”)196 are all led by multimember boards or 
commissions headed by a chair.197  With the exception of the Federal 
Reserve, all of those agencies’ leadership committees are required by 
statute to be composed of members of both political parties.198  The 
Federal Reserve is also exceptional in that Federal Reserve Board 
members serve their terms “unless sooner removed for cause by the 
President.”199  The statutes that delegate authority to the FDIC, the SEC, 
the CFTC, and the NCUA are silent on whether the President possesses 
at will removal power over the Commissioners or Board members of 
those agencies.200   
Although the Seila Law Court was not specifically asked to reach 
the issue of whether the members of such multimember commissions can 
continue to enjoy for-cause removal protections, Chief Justice Roberts, 
writing for the separate majority with respect to the severability issue,201 
indicated that such protections are distinguishable from the CFPB’s 
single-Director structure and are thus constitutional.202  According to 
Roberts, the Court’s decision to remove the CFPB Director’s for-cause 
removal protection “does not foreclose Congress from pursuing 
alternative responses to the problem—for example, converting the CFPB 
into a multimember agency.”203  The Court apparently believes that a 
multimember commission with for-cause removal protection is 
permissible because a multimember structure diffuses authority, rather 
 
196. The NCUA is led by a three-member Board; each Board member is appointed by the 
President to a six-year term, subject to Senate confirmation.  12 U.S.C. § 1752a(b), (c).  The 
President designates the Chairman of the Board.  Id. § 1752a(b).     
197. HENRY B. HOGUE ET AL., INDEPENDENCE OF FEDERAL FINANCIAL REGULATORS 10 tbl.2, 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43391.pdf [https://perma.cc/U9Y7-8PPM] (listing the federal 
financial regulatory agencies and a description of each agency’s leadership structure).  
198. HOGUE ET AL., supra note 168, at 1.  No more than three members of the five-member 
FDIC Board of Directors may be of the same political party.  12 U.S.C. § 1812(a)(2).  The 
same is true of the SEC Commissioners, 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a), and CFTC Commissioners, 7 
U.S.C. § 2(a)(2)(A).  No more than two members of the NCUA Board may be of the same 
party affiliation.  12 U.S.C. § 1752a(b)(1).       
199. 12 U.S.C. § 242.  
200. See 12 U.S.C. § 1812 (FDIC); 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (SEC); 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(2) (CFTC); 
and 12 U.S.C. § 1752a(c) (NCUA).     
201. Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2207–11 (2020).  Of the Justices comprising 
the other sections of the Seila Law majority opinion, only Justices Alito and Kavanaugh joined 
Chief Justice Roberts’ severability analysis; Justice Kagan, joined by Justices Ginsburg, 
Breyer, and Sotomayor, also concurred in the judgement with respect to the severability issue.  
Id. 
202. Id. at 2209.  
203. Id. at 2211. 
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than concentrate it in a single director, thus making it more difficult for 
that authority to be abused and less likely that an independent agency will 
“slip” from the President’s control and impinge the “liberty” of the 
American people.204  However, the Court provided no further support for 
that argument beyond denouncing the CFPB Director’s lack of 
“colleagues to persuade,”205 an omission with which the dissent found 
particularly troubling.206  Regardless of the merits of the Court’s 
reasoning, it is clear that at least for now, multimember commissions that 
lead independent agencies can continue to be insulated from the 
President’s at-will removal power. 
C. FDIC, FSOC, and Legislative Reforms 
Seila Law also increases the President’s control over the FDIC 
and the FSOC.207  The FDIC’s five-member board includes the CFPB 
Director, the Comptroller of the Currency, and three other members 
appointed by the President.208  After Seila Law, the President will no 
longer have to wait for the natural expiration of an inherited CFPB 
Director’s term before selecting a new Director; the President could exert 
greater influence over FDIC policy by installing a CFPB Director who 
shares the President’s policy goals, and by removing the Director at any 
time if he or she deviates from those goals.209  Similarly, the President 
 
204. Id. passim. 
205. Id. at 2204. 
206. According to Justice Kagan, “[t]he purported constitutional problem here is that an 
official has ‘slip[ped] from the Executive’s control’ and ‘supervision’—that he has been 
unaccountable to the President. . . . So to make sense on the majority’s own terms, the 
distinction between singular and plural agency heads must rest on a theory about why the 
former more easily ‘slip’ from the President’s grasp.  But the majority has nothing to offer. . 
. . If the Court is going to invalidate statutes based on empirical assertions like this one, it 
should offer some empirical support.  It should not pretend that its assessment that the CFPB 
wields more power more dangerously than the SEC comes from someplace in the 
Constitution.  But today the majority fails to accord even that minimal respect to Congress.”  
Id. at 2242–44 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).  Justice Kagan asserted 
instead that “[m]ore powerful control mechanisms are needed (if anything) for commissions.  
Holding everything else equal, those are the agencies more likely to ‘slip from the Executive’s 
control.’ . . . A multimember structure reduces accountability to the President because it’s 
harder for him to oversee, to influence—or to remove, if necessary—a group of five or more 
commissioners than a single director.  Indeed, that is why Congress so often resorts to hydra-
headed agencies.”  Id. at 2243 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).     
207. See Phillips, supra note 7 (“After Seila Law, a majority of FDIC board members will 
always be of the president’s party.”).    
208. 12 U.S.C. § 1812(a)(1).     
209. Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2209. 
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now possesses at-will removal power over nine of the ten voting members 
of the FSOC—which includes both the CFPB and FHFA Directors—the 
exception being the Chairman of the Federal Reserve.210  This could also 
potentially provide the President increased control over the FSOC’s 
decision-making.211 
Finally, it is worth noting several bills have recently been 
introduced to Congress in attempts to reform the CFPB, FHFA, and other 
regulatory agencies.212  In June 2019, Republican Senators Mike Lee and 
Josh Hawley introduced the “Take Care Act”213 to eliminate all for-cause 
removal protections for federal executive branch officers.214  While Seila 
Law has now made the CFPB Director removable at will, Congress could 
potentially eliminate all for-cause removal protections for executive 
officers via legislation like the proposed “Take Care Act.”  In September 
2020, in another effort to limit the power of the CFPB and FHFA 
Directors, Representatives Brenda Lawrence and Jody Hice introduced 
the “GAO Mandates Revision Act”215 that would somewhat curtail the 
independence of the CFPB’s and FHFA’s funding arrangements by 
subjecting the CFPB and FHFA to annual audits by Congress and the 
Director of the Office of Management and Budget.216   
 
210. The ten voting members of the FSOC are the Secretary of the Treasury, who serves 
as the Chairperson of the FSOC; the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board; the Comptroller 
of the Currency; the CFPB Director; the SEC Chairman; the FDIC Chairperson; the CFTC 
Chairperson; the FHFA Director; the Chairman of the NCUA Board; and “an independent 
member appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, having 
insurance expertise.”  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-
Frank”) § 111, 12 U.S.C. § 5321(b)(1).     
211. Id. 
212. See infra nn.210–13. 
213. Take Care Act, S. 1753, 116th Cong. (2019).  The bill’s stated purpose is “[t]o promote 
accountability and effective administration in the execution of laws by restoring the original 
understanding of the President’s constitutional power to remove subordinates from office.”  
Id.    
214. Senator Lee remarked: “President Trump was famous for many things even before he 
was elected.  One of those things was the catch-phrase ‘You’re fired,’ which he popularized 
on his reality TV show ‘The Apprentice.’ . . . the head of an organization must always have 
hanging in reserve, sort of like an employer Damoclean sword—the absolute right to 
terminate a subordinate. . . . The bill would restore the unitary executive envisioned by the 
Founders and, in fact, required by the Constitution by stripping away all existing for-cause 
removal protections from the so-called independent agencies.”  165 CONG. REC. S3259–60 
(daily ed. June 5, 2019) (statement of Sen. Mike Lee). 
215. GAO Mandates Revision Act, H.R. 8241, 116th Cong. (2020). 
216. The CFPB is currently subject annually to both an independent external audit and a 
Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) audit conducted by the Comptroller General.  
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) § 1017, 12 
U.S.C. § 5496a.  The GAO Mandates Revision Act would remove the GAO audit 
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VII.  CONCLUSION 
After years of litigation and political quarrelling, the CFPB 
Director’s for-cause removal protection was finally severed from the 
Dodd Frank Act in Seila Law, and the case will likely cement the same 
outcome for the FHFA.217  However, the Court’s decision also affirms the 
constitutionality of the Bureau’s existence and leaves its regulatory 
powers, enforcement actions, and funding arrangement untouched.218  
Seila Law ultimately increases the President’s control over the CFPB and 
the federal financial regulatory framework generally, but the decision will 
have little impact on the CFPB’s past and pending operations.219  As for 
the agency’s future operations, President Biden will likely wield this new 
removal authority to nominate a CFPB Director who will return the 
Bureau to the levels of regulatory and enforcement activities seen under 
President Obama and Director Cordray.220  Despite Congress’ attempt to 
insulate the CFPB from volatile political winds, Seila Law has pushed the 
Bureau further into the storm of Presidential politics. 
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requirement; in addition to the independent external audit, the CFPB would be required to 
“prepare and submit” an annual audit to both Congress and the Director of the Office of 
Management and Budget.  H.R. 8241, § 2.  The same is true for the FHFA.  Id.; see also 12 
U.S.C. § 4516(h) (current annual audit requirements for the FHFA). 
217. Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2211 (2020). 
218. Id. at 2209.  
219. See CFPB v. Seila Law LLC, 984 F.3d 715, 718–20 (9th Cir. 2020) (holding the 
CFPB’s past regulatory and pending enforcement actions were sufficiently ratified after the 
Supreme Court severed the Director’s for-cause removal protection provision).   
220. Ackerman & Restuccia, supra note 145; PETERSON, supra note 149. 
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